The recent cooling in Azerbaijani-Russian relations has drawn the attention of both regional observers and international partners. Against the backdrop of escalating diplomatic tensions, discussions have emerged about the potential role of third-party mediation, particularly by Türkiye, and about the internal developments in Armenia as it moves toward the 2026 parliamentary elections. In an exclusive interview with News.Az, Andrey Petrov, Deputy Director General of the Russian analytical agency Vestnik Kavkaza, offers a detailed assessment of the situation, including the growing strategic role of Azerbaijan in the ECO and regional dynamics in the South Caucasus.
– How do you assess the current crisis in Azerbaijani-Russian relations?
-I am confident that the current localized tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan will be resolved in the spirit of strategic alliance. Both sides are fully committed to maintaining stable cooperation in all areas. On a deeper level, there have been no fundamental changes in the core interests of either party, something that usually characterizes real crises which lead to long-term strategic shifts.
What’s most important right now is that the Russian leadership fully understands the reasons behind this crisis and the nature of Azerbaijan’s protest. Moscow recognizes that Baku is dissatisfied with the lack of progress in the investigation into the AZAL plane crash, and is equally concerned about unlawful actions taken against Azerbaijani citizens and ethnic Azerbaijanis on Russian soil.
We are already seeing progress on the latter issue. As part of the broad anti-crime campaign currently underway across Russia, actions involving Azerbaijani nationals have returned to the legal field, arrests are now being recorded on video and publicly shared. This transparency helps ensure that law enforcement agencies act within the law, reducing the risk of abuse. This shift aligns with one of Azerbaijan’s principal demands.
On the plane crash investigation, I believe Moscow initially underestimated the emotional and political weight this tragedy carries for Azerbaijan. Now, however, it has become clear how important this issue is for Baku. Direct negotiations have intensified, and meaningful dialogue is ongoing. The head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, is in regular contact with Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General Kamran Aliyev. Russia’s Minister of Emergency Situations, Alexander Kurenkov, also recently visited Baku. Russian spokespersons Dmitry Peskov and Maria Zakharova have reiterated that Russia and Azerbaijan must remain strategic partners and that these ties are essential for both countries.
All of this reinforces the conclusion that relations are on track to return to full normalcy. In fact, they remain strong overall—this period is more about restoring mutual sensitivity to key issues. Russia will now better understand and consider Azerbaijan’s concerns moving forward.
Photo: TASS
– How would you interpret Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s recent statement on this crisis?
-President Erdoğan’s call for restraint and a resumption of dialogue between Moscow and Baku can be seen as a gesture of reciprocity. During the 2015 crisis—when Türkiye downed a Russian fighter jet over Syria, it was Azerbaijan that actively helped restore diplomatic ties between Ankara and Moscow. Baku’s quiet diplomacy produced tangible results, eventually leading to the full normalization and even deepening of Russian-Turkish relations.
Shortly after those events, Türkiye faced an attempted coup in 2016. Russia stood by Erdoğan and supported his government in resisting the unconstitutional power grab. Azerbaijan played a major diplomatic role in bringing Russia and Türkiye closer just before that critical moment. Now, years later, Erdoğan has responded in kind, after speaking with President Ilham Aliyev during the ECO Summit in Khankendi, he publicly called for the normalization of Azerbaijani-Russian ties. This was anticipated both in Baku and Moscow, and he delivered.
His timely statement also served to silence speculation that Türkiye was somehow behind the crisis. Experts on the region understand that Ankara gains nothing from a rupture between Baku and Moscow. It maintains a strong alliance with Azerbaijan and productive relations with Russia. When two partners experience a dispute, it’s natural for a third mutual partner to try to help stabilize the situation and Türkiye has done exactly that, wisely and pragmatically.
– What is your view on the current political situation in Armenia, including the arrests of clergy, businessman Samvel Karapetyan, and Prime Minister Pashinyan’s criticism of the Church?
-It is clear that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has begun preparing for the 2026 parliamentary elections. He has launched a proactive campaign against structures and individuals supporting the nationalist opposition, forces that aim to regain power and, potentially, reignite military conflict with Azerbaijan.
Compared to 2021, the opposition now has more time and resources to organize itself. Youth protest sentiment has grown, and there’s a portion of society that simply wants change, regardless of political substance. Pashinyan’s response has been to weaken the financial and institutional base of his opponents. That includes targeting influential Armenian-Russian businessmen like Samvel Karapetyan, who is closely connected to the Karabakh clan and the diaspora elites that support former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan.
These individuals are likely to lobby Moscow for support, through their contacts in the Kremlin, the Foreign Ministry, or other state institutions. Cutting off their political access inside Armenia is a calculated move by Pashinyan.
The same applies to his controversial pressure on the Armenian Apostolic Church. For decades, the Church has been a cornerstone of nationalist ideology. It legitimized the occupation of Azerbaijani territories and supported ethnic cleansing in Karabakh and Eastern Zangazur. As such, it is highly probable that the Church will become a platform for anti-government agitation during the upcoming election cycle.
Pashinyan appears to be trying to place a loyal figure at the head of the Church, which would require replacing Catholicos Garegin II. His legal and media campaign to achieve this is high-risk but politically understandable. Whether he succeeds remains to be seen. The Church is formally independent and could resist such interference.
Still, from a regional stability perspective, it is preferable that Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party retain a parliamentary majority. A return of nationalist forces would likely result in a rollback of diplomatic progress with Azerbaijan and the revival of military risks. Either Kocharyan or Sargsyan, whoever leads the opposition—would use all available levers to provoke a new war. That scenario would be disastrous not only for the South Caucasus but also for Russia and Armenia itself.
While many Armenians may find Pashinyan’s actions toward the Church heavy-handed, they may ultimately prevent a much worse outcome. Only he has cautiously hinted at the possibility of revising Armenia’s Constitution to remove territorial claims against Azerbaijan. The opposition would never even consider it.
The 17th Summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) was held in the Azerbaijani city of Khankendi on July 4. Photo: AZERTAC
– How would you assess the outcome of the 17th ECO Summit in Khankendi?
-The summit’s greatest significance lies in the normalization of hosting large-scale international events with heads of state present on Azerbaijan’s liberated territories. Baku has been strategically organizing conferences and forums in Karabakh and Eastern Zangazur to further integrate these regions into the global political routine.
This is not just about affirming Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the territories, it is about ensuring that the international community no longer questions it. The participation of leaders from Türkiye, Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Afghanistan clearly showed that there is no ambiguity: Karabakh and Eastern Zangazur are universally recognized as Azerbaijani territory.
Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian’s presence was particularly notable. Iran has historically maintained a delicate balance between Baku and Yerevan, but we are now seeing more positive momentum in Iranian-Azerbaijani relations than at any point in the last decade. His attendance reflected this encouraging shift.
Additionally, Azerbaijan continues to demonstrate its ability to revitalize dormant international organizations. Just as it breathed new life into the Non-Aligned Movement, Baku is now energizing the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Azerbaijan offers a pragmatic, depoliticized agenda that resonates with all member states. This leadership—despite Azerbaijan’s relatively small geographic size, positions it as a regional innovator and agenda-setter.
