In the South Caucasus, Armenia, long trapped in a state of blockade, has recently recalibrated its corridor policy, caught at the intersection of the Azerbaijan–Türkiye dilemma. This shift cannot yet be judged as either positive or negative, but it clearly signals moves that may carry some repercussions for the region in the years ahead.
While Yerevan agrees in principle with Baku on reopening communication lines, the question of Zangazur continues to generate deep-seated psychological unease. Instead of seizing the vast economic opportunities that exist at the very crossroads of Eurasia, Armenia remains hesitant, allowing its anxieties to dictate policy. This, in turn, drives Yerevan to search for alternative routes, even when the most direct and mutually beneficial options lie before it.
The third round of political consultations between the foreign ministries of Armenia, Iran, and India in Tehran underscores a shifting regional geometry. While formally framed around transport, trade, and cultural cooperation, the trilateral meeting reveals deeper ambitions, above all, Armenia’s effort to reposition itself as a hub at the intersection of Eurasian connectivity projects and to balance the influence of Azerbaijan and Türkiye by aligning with India and Iran.
The discussion among the three parties spanned the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Armenia’s “Crossroads of the World” project, and the potential use of Iran’s Chabahar port, as well as broader cooperation in trade, culture, and people-to-people exchanges. Besides, they agreed to meet again in Yerevan, underscoring their desire to institutionalise this trilateral format.
It is also evident that strategic objectives lie behind the decision to direct the next meeting to Yerevan. So, it obviously means for Armenia, this trilateral is about more than logistics. Hemmed in by closed borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, Yerevan is searching for alternative alliances and access points. Its “Crossroads of the World” project is an attempt to position itself not as an isolated state, but as a bridge between the INSTC and regional trade flows. By engaging India and Iran, Armenia signals both defiance against the Türkiye–Azerbaijan axis and an aspiration to remain relevant in Eurasia’s shifting infrastructure map.
Cooperation with India is particularly significant. New Delhi has in recent years cultivated a defence and diplomatic partnership with Yerevan, marked by arms sales and joint training. Armenia sees India as a counterweight to Azerbaijan’s deepening defence ties with Pakistan and its close alliance with Türkiye. By embedding India into the South Caucasus dialogue, Armenia hopes to tilt the balance of power, even if symbolically, in its favour.
Iran, meanwhile, serves as Armenia’s only open gateway to the south. Given its long-standing opposition to the Zangazur Corridor, Tehran views closer integration with Yerevan not only as economic pragmatism but also as a strategic necessity. Armenia is exploiting this shared interest, seeking to anchor itself in Iran’s connectivity agenda while strengthening its position vis-a-vis Baku.
India’s participation is not altruistic. There is definitely a regional ambition hidden behind the curtain. As tensions with Pakistan endure and competition with China intensifies, New Delhi is eager to diversify its Eurasian access routes. The INSTC, running from Mumbai through Iran to Russia, remains central to India’s vision. But India also understands that Armenia offers a political partner in the South Caucasus, one willing to support its ambitions without the geopolitical baggage that Azerbaijan and Türkiye bring.
For India, promoting Chabahar port and linking it with Armenian projects helps consolidate its presence in Iran, challenges Chinese influence, and balances Pakistan’s growing partnership with Azerbaijan. It also allows India to project soft power through cultural and educational ties, supplementing its defence cooperation with Yerevan.
As regards Iran, its role is more complex. Tehran sees itself as the backbone of the INSTC, providing the crucial land bridge between India and Russia. However, Iran is deeply wary of any corridor project that bypasses or sidelines it. This explains its categorical opposition to the Zangazur Corridor, which it perceives as a threat to its geopolitical relevance.
For Iran, the trilateral with Armenia and India is a way to reinforce its own indispensability. By drawing Armenia closer, Tehran hopes to block any attempt by Azerbaijan and Türkiye to push projects like the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) or to merge the Middle Corridor with the Zangazur rout
How geopolitics undermines INSTC–Middle Corridor integration prospects
The central question is whether the INSTC could ever link with the Middle Corridor and, by extension, with the Zangazur Corridor. On paper, such integration would benefit all: India would gain faster routes to Europe; Armenia would strengthen its “Crossroads” initiative; and Eurasia would enjoy a more seamless logistics network.
Yet geopolitics intervenes. Iran’s opposition to the Zangazur Corridor makes such a convergence unlikely. Tehran fears that connecting INSTC to the Middle Corridor projects championed by Azerbaijan and Türkiye would diminish its control over trade flows. Moreover, New Delhi’s interest in the Middle Corridor is limited, given its priority to secure reliable access via Chabahar.
Armenia, however, has every incentive to advocate for such a merger. By presenting itself as the “missing link” between INSTC and Eurasian corridors, it seeks to elevate its strategic value. The risk, of course, is that these ambitions remain aspirational unless India and Iran commit tangible resources, a prospect that remains uncertain given both states’ competing priorities.
