By exporting natural gas to Syria for the first time in history, Azerbaijan is reshaping the geopolitical and energy landscape of the Middle East. What once seemed improbable—a South Caucasus country fueling war-torn Syria—has become a reality. Starting August 2, Azerbaijani gas will begin flowing into Aleppo, and from there, possibly deeper into the Syrian heartland. This is not just an energy deal. It is a clear signal: Baku is emerging as a serious geopolitical player beyond its traditional orbit.
Until now, Azerbaijani gas has been associated with European markets. Through the Southern Gas Corridor and other strategic pipelines, Baku positioned itself as a reliable alternative to Russian energy. But the supply route to Syria opens a new chapter—one where Azerbaijani hydrocarbons serve not just markets, but reconstruction, influence, and diplomacy.
Türkiye is central to this pivot. Acting as the transit country, Ankara facilitated the deal by enabling gas flow through Kilis into Syria. The agreement was reached in coordination with Qatar, which financed the pipeline infrastructure. According to Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, 6 million cubic meters of gas per day—around 2 billion cubic meters per year—will be supplied to Syria, initially powering the Aleppo region and potentially reaching Damascus and Homs. It’s a lifeline for Syria’s devastated energy grid, which has struggled for years to provide even basic electricity.
The political backdrop is equally significant. President Ilham Aliyev’s meeting with Syrian transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Baku on July 12 set the stage. A memorandum of understanding between SOCAR and the Syrian government was signed the same day. But the discussions had begun months earlier—back in April, in Antalya—where the Syrian side expressed interest in involving Azerbaijan in the restoration of Syria’s energy sector and even invited SOCAR to explore oil and gas fields in the northeast, currently under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
This is not charity. It’s strategy.
Azerbaijan is investing an estimated $400–600 million in Syria’s energy infrastructure. A joint venture between SOCAR and Türkiye’s BOTAŞ also aims to explore and develop new reserves and invest in petrochemicals. These moves align with President Aliyev’s broader vision: positioning Azerbaijan not just as an energy supplier, but as a cross-border investor, operator, and shaper of regional energy dynamics.
Critically, this initiative aligns with Türkiye’s ambitions to become a regional energy hub. The Kilis–Aleppo pipeline—originally envisioned as part of the Arab Gas Pipeline—was completed in 2011, but its potential remained dormant for over a decade. The geopolitical climate has shifted. With Nabucco dead, the Southern Gas Corridor complete, and Syria in need, the moment has arrived to re-activate long-forgotten infrastructure for new strategic ends.
The Russian energy portal Neftegaz has already called this a “game changer” for the region. Experts believe that stable energy supply to Syria’s industrial and civilian sectors could catalyze broader economic recovery. And if gas reaches Damascus and Homs, the impact could extend well beyond power plants—it could foster a new kind of interdependence across the region.
But there’s more. Israeli outlet Globes suggests a deeper ambition: that Azerbaijan might eventually connect, via Syria, to Israel’s gas pipeline infrastructure. Israel is already linked to Jordan, and Jordan to Syria and Lebanon through the Arab Gas Pipeline. Connecting Homs to Türkiye would require only about 150 kilometers of new infrastructure. According to Globes, Azerbaijan is reportedly ready to invest $200 million to make this link possible.
If realized, this would be nothing short of revolutionary. It would tie the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean into a single, flexible gas grid—enabling flows not only from Azerbaijan but potentially to Azerbaijan as well, depending on geopolitical needs. It would also bring new meaning to energy diplomacy in a region where conflict has too often overshadowed cooperation.
Importantly, Azerbaijan is no longer content with being just an exporter of raw materials. Its recent acquisition of a 10% stake in Israel’s offshore Tamar gas field is proof of its ambitions to become a global player in the energy business. From exploration to infrastructure, from Europe to the Levant, Baku is leveraging its oil and gas know-how as a tool of foreign policy.
What’s emerging is a new pattern of energy geopolitics—one where power is no longer defined solely by reserves or output, but by the ability to connect, invest, and respond to complex regional needs. In that respect, the Azerbaijani gas supply to Syria is not a footnote—it’s a preview of a future energy order shaped less by blocs and more by bridges.
This is a bold experiment. But if successful, it could mark the start of a more integrated and interdependent Middle East—powered, quite literally, by Baku.
By Tural Heybatov
