Amid growing tensions in Azerbaijani-Russian relations, questions are increasingly being raised about the root causes of the current cooling, the role of certain factions within the Russian establishment, and the future of bilateral cooperation in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. In this exclusive interview with News.Az, Russian international affairs expert Grigory Trofimchuk offers his in-depth analysis of the situation. He discusses the transformation of the South Caucasus, the growing influence of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the missteps made by the Russian side, and how they might be corrected. The conversation also touches on the outcomes of the 17th ECO Summit in Khankendi and the prospects for regional integration going forward.
– What are your forecasts regarding the current state of Russian-Azerbaijani relations?
– I would refrain from using overused and vague terms like "crisis" or "conflict," which are often applied indiscriminately and fail to convey the essence of what is truly happening. Whether some like it or not, between 2014 and 2023, Azerbaijan made a historic leap forward, securing a new level of influence and standing in the region — with increasing impact on the geopolitical landscape. There is no going back, and all interested parties, including Russia, will have to adapt to this new reality.
It must be said openly: Azerbaijan and, of course, Türkiye — let’s not hide it — seized the opportunity presented by international developments starting in 2014. The South Caucasus looks quite different now, and the transformation is far from over. Moscow must take this into account and, above all, avoid missteps. Russian public figures should also understand that their immature threats toward Baku could ultimately backfire and harm Russia’s own interests in this vast region, which is also organically linked to Central Asia. That said, experience shows that the same mistakes tend to be repeated again and again, contributing to further destabilization. I cannot guarantee that there will be no future wars.
As for Russian-Azerbaijani relations, this sphere demands fewer clichéd and bureaucratic phrases like "unprecedented level of cooperation," and more sober assessments of the processes now unfolding. Azerbaijan and Türkiye are here to stay — that should have been acknowledged much earlier to prevent strategic miscalculations. Let me add that I was the first Russian expert to write, back in 2007, about the need for Moscow to rethink its relations with Türkiye and Pakistan, as well as with Azerbaijan. At the time, Russia was basking in the warm glow of the West and paid little attention to such strategic matters. By the time reality set in, much had already been lost. Today, it is clear that building stable relations with the new Baku — not merely reverting to outdated formats — is essential.
– Some experts believe that tensions with Azerbaijan are being provoked by certain power centers within the Russian leadership — the so-called “Kremlin towers.” What is your view?
– I don’t think it's accurate to speak of multiple “Kremlin towers.” However, at all levels and within every structure, there are individuals with differing viewpoints. In practice, these diverging views have led to a gradual erosion of Russia’s position in the South Caucasus. This is also evident in what is often called "Russian propaganda," which has now devolved into outright threats against Baku.
For years, Azerbaijan received almost no attention in Russian media. Television coverage was dominated by an endless loop of "USA, Ukraine, USA, Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine, USA, USA, Ukraine" — and so on. When tensions finally flared, it was already too late to suddenly start addressing Azerbaijan.
Moreover, many Russian commentators should at least learn how to correctly pronounce the country’s name — it is neither "Azerbazhan," nor "Azerbadzhan," nor "Azerbayzhan." We must not repeat Gorbachev’s mistakes on this front. If Azerbaijan had received due attention at the highest levels of public-political discourse on Russian television, such a breakdown might have been avoided.
Now everything has been lumped together — Azerbaijan is even being discussed in the context of migrant issues. But Azerbaijanis have never been seen as typical migrant laborers in Russia. There’s nothing wrong with traditional migrant communities from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan, who work in Russia — but Azerbaijanis have historically never been grouped with them. Moreover, the term “diaspora” was rarely applied to Azerbaijanis in the past, though it is now being used more frequently. I can say this as someone who worked directly with relevant official institutions in Moscow, including the former Federal Migration Service (FMS), and other similar bodies.
– As a recognized expert in international affairs — including Russian-Azerbaijani relations — what, in your view, hinders the development of a fully-fledged, mutually beneficial dialogue between Moscow and Baku?
– A meaningful dialogue between Moscow and Baku can only develop if it is grounded in today’s geopolitical and international realities. These realities must reflect not only Russia’s interests but also those of Azerbaijan. In fact, Azerbaijan has always demonstrated a results-oriented approach — whether in bilateral talks, multilateral forums, or broader cooperation frameworks. That pragmatic focus is now more important than ever for Russia.
Russian experts who are not weighed down by the failures of the past could initiate a new dialogue. A well-organized expert-level conference in Baku — widely covered in Azerbaijani media — could become a turning point and spark serious interest from Moscow. Given the current state of bilateral relations, such an event would be anything but routine. The potential for cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan is enormous, and it should not be reduced to existing trade figures. Political disagreements must not stand in the way of realizing this potential.
– How do you assess the outcome of the 17th ECO Summit held in Khankendi?
– This was a landmark, historic event — one that will shape the political identity of Russia’s southern region for decades to come. Crucially, it was not directed against Russia. Rather, it marked a new political alignment. What’s important now is to avoid taking wrong steps that might redirect this vector in an anti-Russian direction. That would be not just dangerous — it would be catastrophic.
The South Caucasus, linked via the Caspian Sea to Central Asia, is becoming a single, integrated region, focused not only on economic cooperation but also on ensuring security — an even more complex task, particularly given the growing role of China. Fortunately, no one has yet revived the “Basmachi narrative” or other destabilizing historical themes that could threaten regional stability.
However, if the West — for instance, through Iran — gains access to the Caspian, this would radically alter the current balance. For now, the summit signaled a commitment to economic cooperation, and that’s the direction we should focus on. Still, potential threats remain — they stem from the broader instability across the post-Soviet space. There is also a latent connection to Russian regions with ethnic components — like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan — which cannot be ignored.
If Russia’s politicized experts continue making provocative or irresponsible statements, they risk triggering undesirable outcomes. To answer your question directly: the Khankendi summit should in no way be seen as hostile. To treat it as such would be to entrench a self-defeating stance of confrontation.
One more point: we should not overlook the demographic reality that the combined population of Azerbaijan and Türkiye now exceeds 100 million — comparable to that of Russia. These rising demographic and strategic scales must be acknowledged. If Russia is serious about building strategic ties with the Global South, then the alliance between Baku and Ankara cannot be ignored.
